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SSM-D17-03682.  To appear in Social Science and Medicine 
Heterogeneous effects of patient choice and hospital 
competition on mortality   
 
Giuseppe Moscellia,b      Hugh Gravelleb,d       Luigi Sicilianib,c Rita Santosb 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine whether the relaxation of constraints on patient choice of hospital in the English 
National Health Service in 2006 led to greater changes in mortality for hospitals which faced 
more rivals before the choice reform. We use patient level data from 2002 to 2010 for three 
high volume emergency conditions with high mortality risk: acute myocardial infarction 
(AMI) (288,279 patients), hip fracture (91,005 patients), stroke (214,103 patients).  Since 
mortality risk varies by sub-diagnoses of AMI and stroke we include indicators for sub-
diagnoses in the covariates. We also allow for the effect of covariates on mortality to differ 
before and after the 2006 choice reform. We find that the choice reform reduced mortality 
risk for hip fracture patients by 0.62% (95% CI: 1.22%, 0.01%), compared with the 2002/3-
2010/11 mean of 3.5%, but had statistically insignificant negative effects for AMI and stroke. 
The reform also had heterogeneous effects across AMI and stroke sub-diagnoses, reducing 
mortality for 3% of AMI patients and 21% of stroke patients.  The reduction in hip fracture 
mortality was greater for more deprived patients. Policies to increase competition and give 
patients greater choice are likely to have heterogeneous effects depending on details of 
patient case mix and market conditions. 
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1 ,QWURGXFWLRQ 
 
Many countries are extending competition in health care (OECD, 2012).  When providers 
face fixed prices per patient, they can only attract more patients by improving quality. It is 
argued that the incentive to improve quality will be greater when providers face more rivals 
and if patients have greater freedom to choose their health care provider (Le Grand, 2003). 
However, theory models of health care markets yield ambiguous predictions about the effect 
of competition on quality (Brekke et al., 2011). (For example, an altruistic provider may be 
producing such high quality that marginal cost exceeds price, and so may reduce quality to 
offset the increase in demand when restrictions on choice are relaxed.)   The empirical 
evidence on hospital competition and quality in fixed price health care systems is mixed and 
intensely debated (Bevan and Skellern, 2011; Bloom et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2012; OHE, 
2012; Pollock et al., 2011 ).  
 
In the English National Health Service (NHS) before 2006 patient choice of hospitals for 
elective hospital treatment was constrained to local NHS hospitals with contracts with the 
SDWLHQW¶VKHDOWKDXWKRULW\,QFRQVWUDLQWVRQFKRLFHRIhospital were relaxed, and patients 
had to be offered a choice of at least four providers. From 2008 patients could choose any 
qualified provider, wherever located. We investigate whether these relaxations of constraints 
on patient choice led to larger changes in quality for hospitals with more competitors.  
 
1.1 Previous literature 
The results from the literature on the effects of competition on quality vary by country, time 
period, and type of condition.   For the US, Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and 
Geppert (2005) find that mortality for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) was lower in more 
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competitive markets. Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) report that greater competition for 
HMO patients reduced heart attack and pneumonia mortality, but greater competition for 
Medicare patients increased mortality. Shen (2003) finds mixed effects of competition on 
AMI mortality.  Mukamel et al. (2001) find no effect of market concentration on all-cause 
mortality. Mukamel et al. (2002) find that higher competition was associated with lower 
clinical expenditures, which in turn was associated with higher mortality. Colla et al. (2014) 
report that competition reduces AMI mortality rates, has no effect on 30-day emergency 
readmission rates for hip and knee replacement and reduces quality for dementia patients. 
Chou et al. (2014) find that report cards on the quality of providers reduced CABG mortality 
for more severely ill patients in more competitive areas. Berta et al. (2016) find that 
competition did not affect a quality index based on mortality and readmissions in Italy.  
 
For the English National Health Service (NHS) during the first NHS internal market in the 
1990ies when providers and local commissioners bargained over prices, Propper et al. (2004) 
report that providers facing more competition had higher AMI mortality and Propper et al. 
(2008) find that, when competition was allowed during this period, providers in more 
competitive areas had a slower rate of decline of AMI mortality. Papers on the post 2002 
NHS internal market when hospitals faced fixed prices reach different conclusions. Using 
cross-sectional data and instrumenting market structure by the political marginality of nearby 
parliamentary constituencies Bloom et al. (2015) find that hospitals in more competitive 
areas had lower AMI mortality. Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) use the 
relaxation of constraints on patient choice of provider in 2006 as a natural experiment, 
arguing that it would have a bigger effect for providers with more rivals.  Using patient level 
data for 2002-2008, Cooper et al. (2011) find that there was an increasing negative effect of 
competition on in-hospital AMI mortality and that this trend became more pronounced in 
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more competitive areas after 2006. Gaynor et al. (2013) use hospital level data for two 
financial years (April-March) 2003/4 and 2007/8. They find that hospitals facing more 
competition in 2003/4 had a larger decrease in AMI mortality rates between 2003/4 and 
2007/8. Moscelli et al. (2016a) report that competition slightly increased emergency 
readmissions for elective hip and knee replacement patients, and had no effect on those for 
elective coronary bypass. Skellern (2017) finds that competition resulted in smaller Patient 
Reported Outcomes  gains for hip and knee replacement patients. 
 
Our analysis also relates to the literature investigating whether quality affects patient choice 
of hospital (e.g. Gaynor et al. (2016) for coronary bypass,  Gutacker et al. (2016) and Beckert 
et al. (2012) for hip replacement).  Although quality is a key explanatory variable in models 
of choice of hospital and is the dependent variable in models of the effect of competition on 
quality, the literatures are complementary since competition can only affect quality if choice 
of hospital is affected by quality.  
 
1.2 Our contribution 
We examine whether the relaxation of constraints on patient choice of hospital had different 
effects on mortality depending on the market structure facing the hospital. We make several 
contributions to the literature.  First, in addition to AMI, we examine the effect of the choice 
reform for two other high volume and high mortality emergency conditions where better care 
should improve outcomes and which are also used as NHS hospital performance indicators: 
hip fracture and stroke.  Stroke causes 10-12% of deaths in the Western world (Donnan et al., 
2008) and the 30 day mortality rate for stroke hospital patients aged 35-74 is 17% in our 
sample compared to 7% for AMI.  One in five people die within one year of a hip fracture 
and one in four requires long-term care (Gillespie, 2000).  The lifetime risk of hip fracture in 
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industrialised countries is 18% in women and 6% in men and all age 30 day mortality is 
around 6%.   Moreover, the main treatment for hip fracture is a hip replacement, usually 
carried out in the same hospital department, and often by the same staff, as elective hip 
replacements and there was a marked increase in competition in elective hip replacement 
during our study period.  Mortality for AMI, hip fracture, and stroke patients is only modestly 
correlated across hospitals, suggesting that they could have been affected differently by 
market structure and the choice reforms. 
  
Second, we use a longer panel (2002/3 to 2010/11) of patient level data than previous studies. 
This enables us to test if there was a change in the effect of market structure after the initial 
relaxation of constraints on patient choice in 2006 and whether there was a further change 
after 2008, when elective patients had the right to choose any qualified provider.  
 
Third, we include sub-diagnoses of AMI, hip fracture and stroke in our case-mix controls to 
allow for the fact that mortality risk may differ substantially for patients with different sub-
diagnoses.  We also investigate whether the effects of the choice reforms differ across sub-
diagnoses.   
 
Fourth, we allow for the effect of patient casemix to differ before and after the 2006 policy 
change. This allows us to control for possible confounding arising from changes in the effects 
of patient characteristics on mortality due to trends in overall population health (manifested 
in changes in age and sex specific mortality rates), advances in medical care, and changes in 
clinical coding as prospective pricing was rolled out. 
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2 ,QVWLWXWLRQDOEDFNJURXQG 
 
NHS hospital treatment is tax funded and there are no charges to patients. Most NHS hospital 
care is provided by public hospitals.  From 2003 private sector providers have been able to 
enter the NHS market and by 2010/11 they treated 4% of NHS elective patients, 
concentrating on a small number of high volume procedures such as hip replacements 
(Hawkes, 2012). Emergency care for NHS funded patients is provided only in NHS hospitals. 
 
During our period (2002/3-2010/11) health authorities (Primary Care Trusts ± PCTs) held 
budgets from the Department of Health to purchase hospital care for their populations. Until 
2003/4 PCTs mainly placed block contracts with local hospitals, under which the hospital 
agreed to treat all patients from the PCT who were referred by their primary care physicians 
(General Practitioners - GPs).  There are over 7,600 general practices with an average of over 
5 GPs and 7,500 patients (NHS Digital, 2016).  GPs could in principle refer to any NHS 
provider, with an out of area tariff being charged if the provider was not in contract with the 
PCT in which the patient was resident. Prospective payment per patient was rolled out 
between 2003/4 and 2008/9, with the proportion of treatments covered and the financial 
reward increasing over time.   
 
Until 2006 the amount of choice of hospital for elective care varied across PCTs and general 
practices, depending on the set of hospitals that had block contracts with PCT and on *3V¶
willingness to refer outside this set.  In January 2006 NHS patients were given the right to be 
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offered a choice of at least four providers. From April 2008 onwards, patients had the right to 
choose any qualified provider, wherever located and whether public or private.  
 
To complement the choice reforms, an electronic booking service for outpatient appointments 
was rolled out from 2005 to help patients and their GPs make a firm booking during a 
consultation (Dusheiko and Gravelle, 2018). Since 2007, the NHS Choices website has 
provided public information on services and quality of providers. These policies led to 
changes in demand patterns and increased hospital elasticity of demand with respect to 
quality (Gaynor et al., 2016; Moscelli et al. 2016b).   
 
3 'DWD 
Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) for financial years 2002/3 to 2010/11 have information on 
all admissions to NHS providers and all NHS-funded hospital admissions to private 
providers.  HES information on patients includes age, gender, dates of admission and 
discharge, discharge method (dead or alive), primary diagnosis and up to 13 secondary 
diagnoses using ICD10 (International Classification of Diseases version 10), and information 
on treatments.  HES DOVRUHFRUGVWKHSDWLHQW¶V/RZHU6XSHU2XWSXW$UHD/62$- the small 
area (1500 mean population) in which the patient lives.  
  
3.1 Mortality  
Most NHS hospitals treat both emergency and elective (non-emergency) patients.  We follow 
the bulk of the empirical literature on hospital competition and quality and measure quality 
by mortality for emergency patients.  Mortality for these patients is well recorded, not subject 
to problems with small numbers, and can be reduced by appropriate treatment. Readmission 
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rates can be subject to selection bias through mortality (Laudicella et al., 2013) and patient 
reported outcome were not available in the pre-choice reform period. 
 
Emergency patients do not choose their provider so that measures of emergency quality do 
not suffer from selection bias arising when unobservably sicker patients choose providers on 
the basis of quality. (See Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) for discussions of the 
merits of using high volume and high mortality emergency admissions to examine the effect 
of competition on quality.)  Since hospitals can only compete for elective patients, the use of 
emergency quality measures is appropriate only if emergency and elective quality are 
positively correlated. Such correlation may occur if quality in all specialities is influenced by 
the overall managerial quality of the hospital (Bloom et al., 2015) or if investments in 
information systems or capital equipment, such as MRI scanners, raise quality across the 
hospital.   
 
Our main patient level quality indicator is whether a patient aged 35 to 74 died in or outside 
hospital within 30 days of admission.  Patients aged 35-74 have lower mortality rates than 
older patients but their risk of death is likely to be more responsive to good quality of care 
(Nolte and McKee, 2012).   
 
3.2 Market structure  
NHS Hospital Trusts can have more than one site. In our sample there are 238 sites and 165 
Trusts with AMI patients, 213 sites and 160 Trusts with hip fracture patients, and 236 sites 
and 163 Trusts with stroke patients.   We test if the competition faced by sites affects 
mortality for these patients.  
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Although we measure health outcomes for patients with one of three emergency conditions, 
our measure of market structure is based on all elective patients   We first compute the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for all LSOAs as the sum of the squared shares of 
elective admissions at providers used by LSOA patients. It is a measure of the amount of 
choice they have amongst elective care providers.  We then compute the HHI for each site in 
each year as the elective patient weighted average of the HHIs of LSOAs within 30 km of the 
site.  
 
To remove possible bias arising from the effect of quality on utilisation we compute HHIs 
using patient shares derived from models of patient choice of provider for elective care in 
which choice depends on distance but is not allowed to depend on quality (Kessler and 
McClellan, 2000).   (See Appendix A.)  For a market with N firms the HHI lies between 1 
(monopoly) and 1/N.  We use 1/HHI ± the equivalent number of equal sized providers ± as 
the measure of competition facing a provider. 
 
3.3 Patient covariates 
Patient level covariates are age, gender, up to 13 comorbidities, source of admission (home, 
nursing home, temporary location), day of the week and month of year admitted, and the 
straight-OLQHGLVWDQFH IURP WKHSDWLHQW¶V /62$ FHQWURLG WR WKH treatment site.  We measure 
severity of comorbidities using the Charlson index (Charlson et al., 1987), which weights 
comorbid conditions by their impact on 10-year mortality risk.  We attribute measures of 
income deprivation, environment deprivation, incapacity benefit claims rate, and disability 
claims rate to patients by their LSOA of residence.   
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To allow for the fact that mortality rates can vary substantially across different types of AMI, 
hip fracture and stroke (Appendix A) and that the mix of types can vary over time, we also 
include dummy variables for sub-diagnoses of AMI, hip fracture and stroke as covariates.  
 
4 0HWKRGV 
We expect the 2006 choice reform to have had different effects on quality for hospitals facing 
different market structures.  We therefore employ a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach 
with a continuous treatment variable (market structure), as pioneered by Card (1992) and 
applied to the effect of choice policy changes on AMI mortality in NHS hospitals by Propper 
et al. (2008) and Gaynor et al., (2013).  
 
Our main specification is a linear probability model 
        0 0 0 1 1iht t h t iht ht iht t ht t h ihtq M P P PE J P Hc c c c       x Ȝ [ ʌ [ Ȝ [ ʌ                  (1) 
where qiht is an indicator for whether patient i aged 35-74, treated in site h in year t died in 
hospital or elsewhere within 30 days of admissions. The post-policy change variable Pt is an 
indicator for the period (2006/7-2010/11) after the initial relaxation of constraints on choice. 
0hM  is the average market structure facing site h in in the pre-choice reform years (2002/3 to 
2005/6).  xiht is a vector of patient covariates, xht is a vector of hospital types (teaching or not, 
Foundation Trust or not), ȝh is a time-invariant hospital site effect and İiht is an error term.  
Year effects Et control for changes in factors common to all providers.  For example, the 
phased introduction of prospective pricing from 2003/4 to 2008/9 meant that the marginal 
revenue from treating additional elective patients increased over this period thereby 
increasing incentives to improve quality.  We estimate separate models for each condition, 
using hospital site fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors on sites.   
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The coefficient of interest is Ȗ.  If a site has no rivals then relaxation of constraints on choice 
can have no effect on incentives to attract more patients by raising quality. The effect of the 
2006 choice reform in (1) is to pivot the linear relationship between mortality and market 
structure through its intercept on the mortality axis.  Thus the change in mortality probability 
for site h GXH WR WKH UHIRUP LVȖ 0hM  and we can compute the average effect of the policy 
UHIRUP DV Ȗ 0M where 0M is the patient weighted mean of 0hM over all sites and we 
multiply by 100 to express the effect with probability measured as a percentage. 
 
Basing the measure of elective market structure on predicted patient flows, which do not vary 
with quality, avoids one source of endogeneity.  But there is another potential threat to 
identification: endogenous entry of providers.  Hospitals could choose to locate in areas 
where patients are healthier and easier to treat, so that there would be more competition 
where mortality is lower.  Or hospitals could locate near existing hospitals with low quality 
so that there is more competition near low quality hospitals. The main source of changes in 
NHS market structure over the period 2002/3 to 2010/11 was the entry of private providers.  
Between 2002/3 and 2008/9, independent sector treatment centres (ISTCs) specialising in a 
small number of elective treatments were given favourable contracts and were encouraged to 
locate in areas where NHS patients were experiencing long waiting times (Department of 
Health, 2004; Department of Health, 2006).  Cooper et al. (2016, Table A3) found that this 
wave of ISTC entry was more likely where existing NHS providers had longer waiting times, 
but it was not associated with their quality.   
 
After 2008 NHS patients could choose any qualified provider, whether first wave ISTC, 
second wave ISTC, non-specialist private hospital, or NHS hospital. If pressure on 
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management to improve quality is driven by overall elective competition (Bloom et al., 
2015), then the fact that the private sector accounted for only 4% of elective NHS treatments, 
even at the end of our period, suggests that endogenous market structure may not be a serious 
problem.  By using time-invariant market structure ( 0hM ), which is not affected by location 
decisions in the 2006 post-reform period, we avoid this problem. 
 
There is a third threat to identification: differences in the effects of covariates before and after 
the choice reform (Meyer, 1995). If Ȝ1 or S1 are not zero then a model without 1iht tPcx Ȝ  and 
1ht tPcx ʌ  will include theses terms in the errors and the estimated ÖJ  will be biased if the 
covariates are correlated with 0hM  in the post choice period. Epidemiological studies suggest 
that changes in mortality risk over time have varied by age, gender, and ethnicity (Koton, et 
al., 2014; Rahimi, et al., 2015; Wu, et al., 2010).  The roll out of prospective pricing over the 
period could also have led to changes in coding practice. Hence we allow the effect of the 
covariates to differ pre and post the choice reform (Abadie, 2005, p4). 
 
5 5HVXOWV 
5.1 Summary statistics 
There were 32,000 emergency admissions aged 35-74 per year for AMI, 10,100 for hip 
fracture, and 23,800 for stroke (Table 1). AMI and stroke admissions fell between 2002/3 
and 2010/11, whilst hip fracture admissions increased.  Average 30-day mortality rates were 
7% for AMI, 4% for hip fracture, and 17% for stroke and declined over our period (Figure 
1).  
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Table 2 reports the correlations of risk adjusted mortality amongst the three conditions. They 
are positive but small in the pre reform period, and increase, though are still not high, in the 
post reform period.  The low correlations suggest that the effects of choice reform could 
differ across the three conditions.  
 
The equivalent number of sites within 30km increased from 2.6 to 3.5 as did the actual 
number of sites with 30km (11.9 to 18.3)  (Figure 2).   
 
5.2 Estimation results  
In Table 3 we report the estimated coefficients on the interaction of the Pt policy break 
indicator, which takes the value of 1 from 2006/7 onwards, with the pre-policy mean market 
structure, ( 0hM ) for provider h in the pre-choice reform period up to 2005/6 (full results are 
in Appendix Table B3).   Models in columns (i) to (iii) do not include indicators for sub-
diagnoses and covariates are not interacted with the policy break indicator.  Columns (iv) to 
(vi) adds indicators for sub-diagnoses and columns (vii) to (ix) report results for the baseline 
specification in equation (1) in which we interact all covariates with the policy break 
indicator.  
 
For the AMI and stroke models adding sub-diagnoses (columns (iv) and (vi)) and then also 
letting the effects of the covariates differ before and after 2006 (columns (vii) and (ix)) leads 
to marked improvement in the goodness of fit.  For hip fracture, adding the sub-diagnoses 
(column (v) versus column (ii)) does not improve the model. Letting the effects of the 
covariates differ pre and post the choice reform (column (viii)) improves goodness of fit 
according to the R2 and AIC but not the BIC, which imposes a heavier penalty for adding 
15 
 
explanatory variables.   Coefficients on the interactions of the post-choice reform dummy and 
the covariates are jointly highly statistically significant (columns (vii) to (ix)).   
 
One explanation for the differences in the implications of adding sub-diagnoses and 
covariate*post-choice policy interactions for hip fracture compared with AMI and stroke is 
that that the three hip fracture sub-diagnoses have very similar mortality rates (3.5%, 3.6% 
and 3.5%) whereas the mortality rates for the sub-diagnoses within AMI and within stroke 
vary considerably, from 3.2% to 9.8% for AMI and from 9.5% to 31.4% for stroke (Appendix 
Table A1).  
 
In all three hip fracture specifications the estimated change in the effect of the number of 
rivals ( ÖJ ) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.  For AMI ÖJ  is statistically 
significant only at 10% for the models which constrain the effects of the covariates to be the 
same before and after the choice reform (columns (i) and (iv)). Allowing these effects to vary 
over time (column (vii)) reduces ÖJ  by two orders of magnitude and its t-statistic to 0.47. 
Estimates of ÖJ  for stroke are not statistically significant even at 10% in any model and its 
sign changes across the specifications.   
 
The results suggest that the choice reform of 2006 reduced mortality for hip fracture, but not 
for AMI and stroke. At the mean pre-reform equivalent number of rivals ( 0M ) the implied 
reduction in mortality risk (100 0ÖMJ ) for hip fracture patients is ±0.62% (95% CI: ±1.22%, ±
0.01%), compared with the 2002/3-2010/11 mean mortality of 3.5%  For AMI and stroke 
patients,  the implied mortality reductions are ±0.18% (95% CI: ±0.91%, 0.56%) and ±0.16% 
(95% CI: ±1.12%, 0.79%) compared with mean mortality of 6.99% and 16.55%.  
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5.3 Choice reform 2008 extension  
From April 2008 patients could choose any qualified provider. This could have further 
increased the responsiveness of hospital demand to quality compared to the 2006 reform, 
leading to a bigger effect of competition from 2008 onwards.  Table 4 has results from a 
model interacting average market structure for the pre 2006 period with indicators for the two 
years after the initial reform (2006/7 and 2007/8) and for the period from 2008/9. The pattern 
of results is similar to those for the 2006 reform in Table 3. For hip fracture the effect of the 
initial reform is negative and a little smaller than in the baseline model in Table 3 though not 
statistically significant.  The effect of the 2008 reform is larger for hip fracture and the 
implied reduction in mortality risk (100 0ÖMJ )  is  ±0.71% (95% CI: ±1.376%, ±0.046%).  
However, the increase in the effect after 2008 is not statistically significant. For AMI and 
stroke, the introduction and extension of choice reform had small and statistically 
insignificant effects. 
 
5.4 Robustness analyses  
Table 5 examine the robustness of the baseline models (Table 3, columns (vii) to (ix)) to 
specifications of the casemix controls.   In panel a, we increase the sample to include all 
patients aged 35 and over, rather than those aged 35 to 74.  Results are not sensitive to this 
extension.  
 
Patients who had an emergency admission in the previous year may be sicker than other 
patients. Alternatively, a patient who has survived one emergency hospitalization may be 
inherently resilient to severe health shocks. If rates of emergency admissions varied across 
hospitals and were correlated with local competition then survivorship bias could affect 
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estimates of the effect of competition.   Panel b excludes patients with any emergency 
admission in the previous year and panel c keeps them but adds the number of emergency 
admissions for any cause in the previous year as a proxy for severity. Results are substantially 
unchanged compared to the baseline models. 
 
Panel a of Table 6 reports results from a conditional fixed effects logistic model. The 
marginal effects are very similar to those from the baseline linear probability specification.   
 
In-hospital deaths were around 88.6%, 84.6% and 97.1% of total deaths within 30 days for 
AMI, hip fracture and stroke patients between 35 and 74 years.   Since the probability of in-
hospital mortality depends on how long the patient is in hospital, as well as on clinical quality 
(Borzecki et al., 2010),  we prefer, like Gaynor et al. (2013) but unlike Cooper et al. (2012), 
to measure 30 day mortality in any location.  Results (panel b) using mortality for patients 
dying in hospital are very similar to those in Table 3.  
 
Next, we vary the way in which we measure competition. Using the actual number of rivals 
within 30km yields the same qualitative results in panel c as our preferred measure based on 
the predicted equivalent number of rivals. Allowing for the much larger magnitude of the 
simple count of rivals (Table 2) the implied changes in mortality ( 0Ö hMJ ) are similar for the 
two competition measures.    
 
Panel d distinguishes between competition from NHS providers and private providers. 
Results with the number of NHS rivals are similar in magnitude and statistical significance to 
those in panel d with the number of rivals of all types.  The magnitude of the coefficient on 
private rivals is much larger than that on NHS rivals but this reflects the smaller number of 
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private rivals.  The implied reductions in hip fracture mortality risk due to choice reform 
(100J 0M ) of  0.35% (95% CI: ±0.59%, ±0.10%) with NHS rivals and 0.26% (95% CI: 
0.47%, 0.06%) with private rivals are not statistically different.    
 
In panel e the competition measure is time varying Mht rather than time invariant 0hM .  The 
coefficients on Pt *Mht are very similar to those in Table 3 for Pt * 0hM , supporting our 
arguments in section 4 that endogeneity of competition is not a problem.  For all three 
conditions the pre-reform effect of market structure (į) was to increase mortality (though not 
statistically significantly) and the relaxation of the constraints on choice reduced this 
deleterious effect of having more rivals, though the reduction was only significant for hip 
fracture.  More rivals post-reform were still associated with higher mortality for all 
conditions, though none of these associations were statistically significant.  
 
Panels f and g uses terciles of competition measures rather than the continuous measures of 
competition from NHS rivals, along with the number of private rivals.  Results are 
qualitatively similar to those in the baseline models and to those in panel d.  
 
5.5 Heterogeneity within conditions 
We included indicators for sub-diagnoses in our baseline models since there are marked 
differences in mortality rates for sub-diagnoses within AMI and stroke (see Appendix Table 
A1).  Given these differences in mortality rates across sub-diagnoses within two of the 
conditions, we replaced the Pt* 0hM  interactions in the baseline models (1) with sub-
diagnosis*Pt* 0hM  interactions to test if the effect of the choice reform differed across sub-
diagnoses within conditions.  Results for AMI (Appendix Table B4) show that there were 
19 
 
statistically significant reductions in mortality only for two sub-diagnoses covering 3% of 
AMI patients.  The implied reductions are large for these two sub-diagnoses: 2.6% and ±
3.3% compared to their mean mortalities of 6.49% and 4.93%.  For stroke there was a 
statistically significant mortality reduction only for the 21% of stroke patients with an 
unspecified stroke. For hip fracture the effects of choice reform were negative for all sub-
diagnoses and similar in size.    
 
5.6 Heterogeneity with respect to deprivation 
The baseline model suggested that there was income related inequity in hip fracture mortality 
with patients living in small areas with greater income deprivation having higher mortality, 
though there was no association for AMI or stroke (Appendix Table B3). We estimated 
models with dummies for the first four quintiles of the distribution of the deprivation 
measure, with the first quintile being the most deprived, including interactions of these 
dummies with the P t dummy and with Pt *( 0 0hM M ).  We find that hip fracture patients in 
hospitals in more competitive areas had greater reductions in mortality post choice and this 
reduction was greater for patients in more deprived areas (Appendix Table B5).  Thus the 
combination of the choice reform and more competition produced the greatest benefit for the 
most deprived hip fracture patients.  
 
5.7 Comparison with other papers 
Two other papers use the 2006 choice reform in a difference in differences approach to 
examine the effect of competition on AMI mortality. Cooper et al. (2011) use time varying 
competition, quarterly data from 2002 to 2008 on individual patients aged 35 to 100, and 
deaths in hospital within 30 days.  Gaynor et al. (2013) use two years of Hospital Trust level 
data to examine whether 30 day mortality in or outside hospital for patients aged 35 to 74 in 
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2007 was smaller for Trusts facing more competition in 2003.  Both papers find a statistically 
significant greater reduction in AMI mortality post choice for providers facing more 
competition.  
 
We also find a reduction in overall AMI mortality but the effect is small and not statistically 
significant, though the negative effect on mortality is statistically significant for a subset of 
AMI diagnoses (Table 7)  covering 3% of AMI patients. Our sensitivity tests suggest that the 
difference in results for overall AMI is not due to the age range of AMI patients, whether 
deaths were in hospital or in any location, or whether time-invariant or time-varying 
competition is used.  The difference seems to be due (Table 3, see also Appendix Table C1) 
to the combination of a richer set of covariates (indicators for sub-diagnoses) and to allowing 
the effects of covariates to differ before and after the change in choice policy in 2006.  By 
using time varying coefficients on covariates, we control for possible changes in the effects 
of SDWLHQWV¶ EDVHOLQH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG for changes in clinical coding practice related to 
patient casemix which might have been influenced by the roll out of the prospective payment 
system.  
 
6 &RQFOXVLRQV 
 
Increases in the responsiveness of demand to quality after the relaxation of constraints on 
patient choice would plausibly have bigger effects on hospital incentives to improve quality 
in areas where hospitals faced more competition. We indeed find that after the 2006 choice 
reform, there was a larger reduction in hip fracture mortality in hospitals which had faced 
more competition before the reform. The mean reduction in mortality was ±0.62% (95% CI: ±
1.22%, ±0.01%) compared to the mean risk of 3.5%.  The change in the effect of market 
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structure after 2006 had no effect on overall mortality for AMI patients, though it did reduce 
mortality for a subset of diagnoses covering 3% of AMI patients. For stroke patients the 
choice reforms had no overall effect though mortality was reduced for the 21% of stroke 
patients with the unspecified stroke sub-diagnosis. Our findings are robust to alternative 
measures of market structure, to using time-varying measures of competition instead of time-
invariant pre-reform measures, to estimation methods, and to casemix adjustments for age 
and previous emergency admissions.  
 
The initial choice reform of 2006 gave patients the right to a choice of at least four hospitals 
and the further relaxation of constraints on choice in 2008 let patients choose any qualified 
public or private hospital. Both choice reforms led to reductions in mortality for hip fracture 
patients, with a larger reduction after the 2008 reform. 
 
Theory models suggest possible explanations for the difference in results across type of 
condition since they show that having more rivals and relaxing restrictions on patient choice 
could increase or reduce quality, depending on the properties of the demand and production 
functions, the objectives of the hospital, and the level of the regulated price (Brekke et al. 
2011).  Quality improved for emergency hip fracture patients in more competitive areas.  The 
main treatment for hip fracture patients is a hip replacement carried out in orthopaedic 
departments and other studies (Moscelli et al. 2016a; Skellern, 2017) have found that 
competition did not increase and may even have reduced quality for elective hip replacement 
patients.  A possible explanation for these contrasting results for elective and emergency hip 
patients is the existence of diseconomies of scope (Freeman et al, 2016; Skellern, 2017) at 
hospital level. 
 
The fact that the effect of the choice reforms differed across conditions, and across sub-
diagnoses within conditions, suggests that policies to increase competition and give patients 
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greater choice are likely to have heterogeneous effects depending on details of patient case 
mix and market conditions.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (patients 35 to 74,  2002/3-2010/11) 
 
AMI sample Hip Fracture sample Stroke sample 
  
mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max 
Providers 
            
N NHS sites1 178 9.18 165 194 169 4.92 164 179 182 9.13 171 198 
N rival sites - 30 km 12.15 15.04 0 76 13.63 16.80 0 76 14.40 17.51 0 76 
N rival Trusts - 30 km 5.61 6.78 0 28 6.16 7.41 0 28 6.55 7.72 0 28 
1/predicted HHI 30km  2.69 1.35 1.09 8.76 2.81 1.45 1.09 9.47 2.87 1.47 1.09 8.83 
N rival NHS sites - 30 km 11.34 14.45 0 66 12.62 16.08 0 66 13.43 16.81 0 66 
N rival private sites - 30 km 0.81 1.58 0 12 1.01 1.79 0 12 0.97 1.79 0 12 
Patients 
            
N patients per year  32032 4814 24921 39560 10112 601 9552 11042 23789 1533 21797 26465 
Overall 30-day mortality  0.0699 0.2549 0 1 0.0350 0.1839 0 1 0.1655 0.3717 0 1 
Patient age 61.18 9.38 35 74 64.84 8.74 35 74 62.74 9.52 35 74 
Female Patient 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1 
N diagnoses 4.66 2.67 1 20 5.01 2.72 1 20 4.82 2.82 1 20 
Charlson index 0.69 1.10 0 14 0.75 1.26 0 13 0.81 1.28 0 13 
Distance to provider 12.86 30.65 0 607 13.54 32.36 0 572 12.06 27.32 0 610 
IMD income deprivation 0.16 0.12 0 0.96 0.16 0.12 0 0.96 0.17 0.13 0 0.96 
IMD environment deprivation 21.39 16.59 0.08 94 22.02 16.72 0.08 94 22.67 16.98 0.13 94 
Incapacity claims 0.0387 0.0252 0 0.2519 0.0388 0.0263 0 0.2519 0.0391 0.0255 0 0.2519 
Disability claims 0.0579 0.0305 0 0.2491 0.0571 0.0313 0 0.2491 0.0574 0.0305 0 0.2491 
Notes. 1 Sites of NHS Hospital Trusts with at least 100 patients of all ages with these conditions.   
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Table 2. Correlation of risk adjusted mortality across hospital sites  
 
2002/3-2005/6 2006/7-2010/11 2002/3-2010/11 
AMI & hip fracture   0.066* 0.142*** 0.205*** 
AMI & stroke     0.090** 0.143*** 0.223*** 
Hip fracture & stroke 0.010 0.166*** 0.170*** 
Notes. Correlations for sites over all site by year observations where the site had at least 100 cases for both 
conditions.  Adjusted mortality: ratio of actual to expected mortality predicted from year specific individual 
level logit models with age, gender, Charlson Index, number of diagnosis, day of week, admission month.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 3. Impact of 2006 choice reform on 30 day mortality 
 No sub-diagnoses covariates With sub-diagnoses covariates Effects of sub-diagnoses vary pre 
and post 2006 choice reform 
 AMI Hip fracture Stroke AMI 
Hip 
fracture Stroke AMI 
Hip 
fracture Stroke 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
P t*Pre-2006 rivals (Ȗ)  -0.0022* -0.0026** 0.0012 -0.0026* -0.0026** 0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0024** -0.0006 
 
(-1.734) (-2.333) (0.650) (-1.833) (-2.326) (0.986) (-0.472) (-1.991) (-0.334) 
          
R2 0.0447 0.0520 0.0251 0.0518 0.0520 0.0889 0.0551 0.0532 0.0912 
AIC 16993 -54735 178406 14848 -54733 163921 13948 -54777 163473 
BIC 17447 -54330 178848 15397 -54309 164404 14953 -54014 164346 
F-test: all sub-diagnoses coefs = 0    81.87 1.04 951.69 51.30 0.85 530.73 
p value    0.000 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.000 
F test: all P t*covariates coefs = 0       125.9 38.49 116.53 
p-value       0.000 0.000 0.000 
Patients 288279 91005 214103 288279 91005 214103 288279 91005 214103 
Sites 238 213 236 238 213 236 238 213 236 
Sub-diagnoses in covariates? N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
P t*Covariates?  N N N N N N Y Y Y 
Notes. P t: dummy for 2006/7-2010/11. Columns (vii) to (ix): specification in text equation (1).   t statistics in parentheses.   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05.    
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Table 4. Impact of introduction and extension of choice reform 
 
AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
2006 reform introduction*Pre 2006 Rivals (J1) -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0011 
 
(-0.472) (-1.297) (-0.576) 
2008 reform extension*Pre 2006 Rivals (J2) -0.0006 -0.0027** -0.0003 
 
(-0.389) (-2.107) (-0.120) 
    
R2 0.0551 0.0532 0.0912 
AIC 13950 -54775 163474 
BIC 14965 -54003 164358 
 
   
F-test H0: J1=J2 0.01 0.59 0.25 
F-test p-value  0.91 0.44 0.62 
Notes.  2006 reform introduction: indicator for 2006/7 and 2007/8.  2008 reform extension: indicator for 2008/9 onwards. t 
statistics in parentheses. Otherwise specification is text equation (1).  ** p<0.05   
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Table 5. Impact of 2006 choice reform: robustness to case-mix 
  AMI Hip-fracture Stroke 
a. Patients aged 35 years and over 
P t*Pre-2006 rivals Ȗ -0.0006 -0.0025** 0.0020 
 (-0.311) (-2.018) (0.880) 
R2 0.0962 0.0734 0.1172 
Patients 531210 459672 550201 
b  Excluding patients with any emergency admission in previous year 
 
P t*Pre-2006 rivals  0.0000 -0.0029*** 0.0004 
 (0.001) (-2.602) (0.221) 
R2 0.0487 0.0481 0.0971 
Patients  251649   77462   178180  
c. Including number of emergency admissions in previous year 
P t*Pre-2006 ULYDOVȖ -0.0007 -0.0023* -0.0008 
 (-0.489) (-1.934) (-0.451) 
N emerg adm prev year 0.0136*** 0.0183*** 0.0297*** 
 (8.287) (7.188) (12.713) 
R2 0.0560 0.0561 0.0937 
Patients 288247 90998 214035 
    
Sites 238 213 236 
Notes. P t: dummy for 2006/7-2010/11. Specification: text equation (1) plus addition of number of emergency admissions in 
panel c.  t statistics in parentheses.   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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Table 6. Impact of 2006 choice reform: further robustness checks 
  AMI Hip-fracture Stroke 
a. Logistic regression    
P t*Pre-2006 rivals (AME) -0.000438 -0.00232** -0.000990 
 (-0.31) (-1.98) (-0.54) 
Pseudo R2 0.1026 0.1509 0.0995 
b. 30 day in-hospital mortality    
P t *Pre-2006 rivals (J)  -0.0013 -0.0023** 0.0001 
 
(-0.925) (-2.051) (0.036) 
    R2 0.0525 0.0515 0.0921 
AIC -16232 -68409 158972 
BIC -15227 -67646 159845 
c. Market structure: number of rivals  
P t*Pre-2006 Rivals (J) -0.0001 -0.0003** -0.0002 
 (-0.764) (-2.564) (-1.322) 
R2 0.0551 0.0533 0.0912 
AIC 13947.2 -54779.7 163470.1 
BIC 14951.6 -54016.7 164343.4 
d. Market structure: number of NHS and private rivals  
P t*pre 2006 NHS rivals -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0002 
 (-0.712) (-2.791) (-1.109) 
P t*pre 2006 private rivals  0.0027 -0.0227** 0.0203* 
 (0.223) (-2.548) (1.713) 
R2 0.0551 0.0533 0.0912 
AIC 13949 -54784 163469 
BIC 14964 -54012 164352 
e. Time-varying market structure   
Rivals pre reform (G) 0.0012 0.0047* 0.0051 
 (0.462) (1.946) (1.379) 
P t*Rivals  (J) -0.0007 -0.0024** -0.0013 
 (-0.500) (-2.060) (-0.724) 
Rivals post reform (G + J) 0.0005 0.0023 0.0038 
 (0.250) (1.226) (1.241) 
R2 0.0551 0.0532 0.0912 
AIC 13950 -54776 163471 
BIC 14965 -54004 164355 
f. Discretized time-invariant market structure (1/predicted HHI) in terciles   
2nd tercile of Pre-2006 Rivals -0.0016 0.0015 0.0019 
 (-0.398) (0.374) (0.369) 
3rd tercile of Pre-2006 Rivals -0.0006 -0.0069* 0.0018 
 (-0.156) (-1.665) (0.335) 
1 or more private hospitals pre-2006 -0.0046 -0.0382*** 0.0390*** 
 (-0.294) (-8.993) (4.053) 
R2 0.0551 0.0534 0.0912 
AIC 13952 -54785 163469 
BIC 14977 -54004 164363 
g. Discretized time-invariant market structure (Number of rivals) in terciles   
2nd tercile of Pre-2006 Rivals 0.0003 -0.0039 0.0080 
 (0.073) (-1.038) (1.462) 
3rd tercile of Pre-2006 Rivals -0.0047 -0.0108*** -0.0002 
 (-1.276) (-2.731) (-0.042) 
1 or more private hospitals pre-2006 -0.0068 -0.0405*** 0.0425*** 
 (-0.431) (-9.508) (4.410) 
R2 0.0551 0.0534 0.0912 
AIC 13947 -54789 163464 
BIC 14973 -54008 164358 
Patients  288286 91005 214103 
Sites  238 213 236 
Notes. Specification: equation (1) except for changes indicated in panels. Market structure: number of sites within 30km in 
panels c and d, equivalent number of rivals in other panels. Panel a reports average marginal effects.  t-statistics in 
parentheses.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1. Trend in 30 day mortality rates, patients aged 35-74 years 
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Figure 2. Competition measures: trend 2002-2010 
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Appendix A.  Data 
 
Patient sample.  
Our sample is patients with an emergency admission for AMI, hip fracture and stroke  at a 
NHS hospital site with at least 100 admissions per year for the condition. To reduce mis-
coding we exclude patients with a length of stay of 2 days or less who were discharged alive.  
We assign patients transferred to another hospital site during their spell to the first site of 
their in-hospital spell, since patients are usually treated and stabilised in the Emergency 
Department of the first provider. 
 
We include indicators for sub-diagnoses in the models for each condition.  Table A1 
summarises the ICD10 codes for the sub-diagnoses for the three conditions.   Following the 
advice in Alexandrescu et al. (2013) we do not aggregate the 10 AMI sub-diagnoses into 
STEMI and NSTEMI.  
 
Table A1. Definitions of conditions 
Code Definition % of patients 30 day mortality % 
AMI    
I210 Acute transmural MI of anterior wall 16.13 6.69 
I211 Acute transmural MI of inferior wall 21.8 4.63 
I212 Acute transmural MI of other sites 2.26 6.49 
I213 Acute transmural MI of unspecified site 0.79 4.93 
I214 Acute subendocardial MI: MI with non-ST 
elevation, Nontransmural MI NOS  11.41 3.15 
I219 AMI, unspecified: MI (acute) NOS 33.44 9.30 
I220 Subsequent MI of anterior wall 1.64 8.88 
I221 Subsequent MI of inferior wall 2.36 6.73 
I228 Subsequent MI of other sites 1.68 6.41 
I229 Subsequent MI of unspecified sites 8.49 9.84 
Hip fracture    
S720 Unspecified 74.63 3.47 
S721 Petrochanteric 20.95 3.64 
S722 Subtrochanteric 4.42 3.45 
Stroke    
I60, I61, I62 Haemorrhagic 26.69 31.43 
I63 Ischemic 50.89 9.46 
I164 Unspecified 20.96 15.61 
I166 Occlusion 0.31 7.94 
G46, I672, I698, 
R470 Other 1.15 4.47 
Note. statistics are for the main estimation sample (patients aged 35-74). MI: myocardial infarction. NOS: not 
otherwise specified. 
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Table A2. Correlations of sub-diagnosis mortality rates  
|(i) AMI, years 2002-2006  
 I210 I211 I212 I213 I214 I219 I220 I221 I228 I1229 
I210 1          
I211 0.5330*** 1         
I212 0.2990** 0.0986 1        
I213 0.0397 -0.0021 -0.0397 1       
I214 -0.0064 0.0765 -0.1750 -0.1100 1      
I219 0.256* 0.1230 -0.0209 -0.1780 0.0691 1     
I220 0.0301 0.1230 -0.0427 -0.0487 -0.1490 -0.0292 1    
I221 0.0674 0.1350 0.0553 0.0394 -0.0232 -0.2430* -0.0849 1   
I228 0.1010 0.1040 0.0355 -0.0390 0.0635 0.2290 0.1220 0.2090 1  
I229 0.0086 -0.2220 -0.1600 0.0045 -0.2320 0.1670 0.0583 0.0801 0.281* 1 
|(ii) AMI, years 2006-2010  
 I210 I211 I212 I213 I214 I219 I220 I221 I228 I1229 
I210 1          
I211 0.4500*** 1         
I212 0.1060 0.4770*** 1        
I213 -0.1310 -0.2510 -0.1010 1       
I214 0.3170* 0.3260** 0.2970* -0.0532 1      
I219 0.5430*** 0.2690 -0.0393 0.1770 0.2120 1     
I220 -0.1260 0.4710*** 0.0268 0.1560 0.1490 -0.0591 1    
I221 0.0180 0.4590*** 0.2330 -0.118 0.346** -0.0753 0.641*** 1   
I228 0.0459 0.2330 -0.0319 -0.0136 0.202 -0.256 0.3240* 0.4980*** 1  
I229 0.4770*** 0.4450*** 0.0358 -0.0678 0.385** 0.548*** 0.156 0.1100 0.0834 1 
(iii) Hip fracture, years 2002-2006 
 S720 S721 S722 
S720 1   
S721 0.0364 1  
S722 0.1420 0.2810* 1 
(iv) Hip fracture, years 2006-2010 
 S720 S721 S722 
S720 1   
S721 0.1410 1  
S722 0.2510 -0.0192 1 
(v) Stroke, years 2002-2006 
 I60,I61, I62 I63 I164 I166 G46, I672, I698, 
R470 
I60, I61, I62 1     
I63 0.0638 1    
I164 0.0976 0.5130*** 1   
I166 -0.1960 -0.2190 -0.1600 1  
G46, I672, 
I698, R470 
-0.1900 0.1600 -0.0469 -0.0868 1 
(vi) Stroke, years 2006-2010 
 I60,I61, I62 I63 I164 I166 G46, I672, I698, 
R470 
I60, I61, I62 1     
I63 0.1670 1    
I164 0.4560*** 0.4470*** 1   
I166 0.2530 0.4210*** 0.3370** 1  
G46, I672, 
I698, R470 
-0.0381 0.0517 -0.2100 -0.0325 1 
Note.  Correlations of site by year mortality rates.   
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Market structure: predicted equivalent number of sites 
Our main market structure measure is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): the 
sum of the square of provider market shares. For a market with N firms it varies between 1 
(monopoly) and 1/N. The HHI for patients in LSOA j is the sum of the squared shares of their 
elective admissions at the providers they use.  It is a measure of the amount of choice they 
have amongst elective care providers. We compute the HHI for site h as a weighted average 
of the HHIs for patients in LSOAs within 30 km of site h: 
  2h j hj jhjj hj hHHI HH s ss I ª º u  u« »¬ ¼¦ ¦¦     (A1) 
where j=1«-  indexes English LSOAs, sjh is the proportion of patients from LSOA j treated 
at a site h within 30km of their LSOA, and  shj is the proportion of site h patients from LSOA 
j within 30km of site h.   
 
To remove possible bias arising from the effect of quality on utilisation we compute 
predicted HHIs derived from models of patient choice of provider (NHS and private sites) for 
elective care in which choice is not allowed to depend on quality (Kessler and McClellan, 
2000).   We estimate Poisson choice models with the number of elective patients from LSOA 
j choosing provider h in year t having conditional mean  
       ^ `2 21 2 1 2| , , exp X Xjht j jh ht jt t jh t jh ht t jh ht t jh ht tn d X d d X d X d X[ [ O O O O O(             (A2) 
where djh is the distance from the centroid of LSOA j to hospital site h within 30km.  Xht is a 
vector of dummies for hospital characteristics (NHS or private, belonging to a Foundation 
Trust, belonging to a teaching Trust, located in London). NHS Foundation Trusts have more 
discretion in paying staff, using surpluses, do not have to break even each year and can 
borrow from the capital market (Marini et al., 2008).  Foundation Trusts status was 
introduced in 2004 and by 2010 60% of NHS Trusts were Foundation Trusts. About 20% of 
NHS hospitals have Teaching status, undertaking additional activities including teaching and 
research, and treating more complex patients.   
 
+(6GHILQHVHOHFWLYHDGPLVVLRQVDVWKRVH³ZKHUHWKHGHFLVLRQWRDGPLWFRXOGEHVHSDUDWHGLQ
time from the actual aGPLVVLRQ´We exclude elective patients whose admissions were part 
of a planned course of treatment (for example, patients on dialysis, or cancer patients on 
chemotherapy). 
 
The Poisson model yields the same estimated coefficients as the conditional logit model 
(Guimaraes et al., 2003; Guimaraes, 2004) but is quicker to estimate. The estimates of the 
Poisson choice models are in Appendix Table B1. Models interacting patient characteristics 
with hospital site characteristics yielded very similar predicted patient flows. 
 
The predicted Ö jhtn from eq (A2) are used to compute the predicted shares Ö jhts Ö Ö/jht jhthn n ¦  
and Öhjts Ö Ö/jht jhtjn n ¦ , and used in eq. (A2), instead of the actual flows, to compute the 
predicted HHI indices.   Since the reciprocal of the HHI is the number of equal sized firms, 
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which would yield the HHI, we use the reciprocal of the predicted HHI as the measure of 
competition facing a provider.  
 
The inverse predicted HHI is conceptually to be a better measure of market structure than the 
count of rivals which assumes that having an additional rival 1km away will have the same 
effect as having a rival 30km away. Nor does it take account of whether the additional rival is 
large or small.  The inverse predicted HHI is based on patient flows predicted from a model 
of patient choice of provider in which providers further away from patients attract fewer 
patients.  It thus takes account of the size and location of possible rivals. 
 
Market structure: number of rivals 
We count for each year and for each hospital site providing care for AMI, hip fracture, or 
stroke patients, the number of rival organisations (NHS Trusts or chains of private providers) 
with at least one site within 30km which has at least 100 HES elective patients in that year.  
We also constructed counts of rivals within 20, 40 and 50 km. Around 75% of elective 
patients use a provider within 30km.  Competition measures using different distances and 
methods are highly correlated (see Appendix Table B2). 
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Appendix B.  Additional results  
 
Figure B1. Numbers of elective care providers by year and ownership 
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Table B1.  Poisson models of patient choice of elective provider 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
coef coef coef coef coef coef coef coef coef 
Distance -0.2218*** -0.2221*** -0.2213*** -0.2187*** -0.1986*** -0.1988*** -0.1656*** -0.1686*** -0.1642*** 
Distance^2 0.0026*** 0.0028*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 
Private Hospital -4.3093*** -4.9789*** -4.3093*** -3.6677*** -3.1165*** -3.0299*** -2.5119*** -2.1926*** -2.0811*** 
Teaching Trust 0.2960*** 0.1450*** -0.0055 -0.0971*** -0.1062*** -0.0641*** 0.1288*** 0.0069 -0.0743*** 
Specialist Hospital -1.8382*** -1.9368*** -1.9708*** -1.9506*** -2.1845*** -2.2383*** -2.0953*** -2.1830*** -2.2349*** 
Multiservice Hospital 0.2706*** 0.2596*** 0.2979*** 0.0198* 0.2331*** 0.1581*** 0.1302*** -0.0876*** -0.1708*** 
Site in London 0.3378*** 0.3198*** 0.2631*** 0.1836*** 0.2848*** 0.3952*** 0.5465*** 0.6193*** 0.6997*** 
Private Hospital * Distance 0.2036*** 0.3126*** 0.1261*** 0.0415*** 0.0776*** 0.0694*** 0.0331*** 0.0400*** 0.0278*** 
Teaching Trust * Distance -0.0658*** -0.0610*** -0.0266*** -0.0141*** -0.0118*** -0.0264*** -0.0315*** -0.0225*** -0.0189*** 
Specialist Hospital * Distance 0.0799*** 0.0944*** 0.1050*** 0.0928*** 0.1139*** 0.1040*** 0.1010*** 0.1017*** 0.1057*** 
Multiservice Hospital * Distance -0.0815*** -0.0717*** -0.0592*** -0.0296*** -0.0779*** -0.0724*** -0.0901*** -0.0667*** -0.0709*** 
Site in London * Distance -0.1156*** -0.1110*** -0.1264*** -0.1350*** -0.1456*** -0.1494*** -0.1939*** -0.1972*** -0.1990*** 
Private Hospital * Distance^2 -0.0059 -0.0079*** -0.0015*** 0.0004** -0.0003** -0.0001 0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 
Teaching Trust * Distance^2 0.0025*** 0.0024*** 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0018*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 
Specialist Hospital * Distance^2 -0.0008*** -0.0013*** -0.0016*** -0.0010*** -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** 
Multiservice Hospital * Distance^2 0.0032*** 0.0022*** 0.0031*** 0.0025*** 0.0039*** 0.0035*** 0.0039*** 0.0032*** 0.0035*** 
Site in London * Distance^2 0.0036*** 0.0034*** 0.0039*** 0.0041*** 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0059*** 
Foundation Trust   -0.1177*** 0.1303*** 0.5184*** 0.2881*** 0.4379*** 0.3984*** 0.4569*** 
Foundation Trust * Distance   0.0145*** -0.0192*** -0.0696*** -0.0395*** -0.0785*** -0.0606*** -0.0562*** 
Foundation Trust * Distance^2   -0.0005*** 0.0001** 0.0019*** 0.0011*** 0.0025*** 0.0019*** 0.0017*** 
Patients Group  LSOAs 175946 184324 187504 197304 201694 213538 237493 243430 267771 
LSOAs 29974 29436 29614 29740 29884 30669 30915 31108 31552 
Chi^2 model 2187257 2202837 2065478 2196952 2380851 2759517 3177565 3240990 3558575 
Efron R^2 0.249 0.2485 0.2493 0.2629 0.2592 0.2661 0.2411 0.2447 0.2426 
Notes. Specification (A2). All booked or waiting list patients treated in hospitals with at least 100 admissions per year and within 30km from LSOA of residence.  Efron R2 is 
the squared correlation between actual and predicted numbers choosing each site.   *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table B2. Correlation among competition measures (all years: 2002-2010) 
 
1/(actual HHI 
30km) 
1/(predicted 
HHI 30km) 
1/(actual 
HHI 
100km) 
1/(predicted 
HHI 100km) 
N rival 
sites 30km 
N rival trusts 
30km 
1/(predicted HHI 30km) 0.7996 
     
1/(actual HHI 100km) 0.9092 0.6291 
    
1/(predicted HHI 100km) 0.816 0.9833 0.6547 
   
N rival trusts 30km 0.6944 0.7936 0.5513 0.8412 
  
N rival trusts 30km 0.6876 0.8109 0.5338 0.8522 0.9756 
 
Av N rival sites 30km 0.6704 0.7604 0.5364 0.8106 0.9506 0.9268 
Notes. Predicted HHIs are computed from a Poisson choice model using patient-provider distances and hospital 
characteristics except quality.  All correlations significant at 99% confidence level. Average number of rival 
sites computed as the yearly average of the number of sites belonging to a same trust. 
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Table B3.  Full results for models in columns (iv) to (vi) of Table 3.   
 
(1) 
AMI 
(2) 
Hip Fracture 
(5) 
Stroke 
Market structure measure: Equivalent N rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 30km 
Equivalent N rival sites 
30km 
2002 0.0143*** 0.0041 0.0107*** 
 
(5.410) (1.427) (2.722) 
2003 0.0105*** -0.0000 0.0099** 
 
(4.391) (-0.003) (2.543) 
2004 0.0048** -0.0002 0.0028 
 
(2.260) (-0.079) (0.853) 
2006 0.0013 -0.0027 -0.0117** 
 
(0.299) (-0.618) (-2.302) 
2007 -0.0108** -0.0031 -0.0074 
 
(-2.376) (-0.712) (-1.353) 
2008 -0.0193*** -0.0063 -0.0167*** 
 
(-4.140) (-1.395) (-3.130) 
2009 -0.0268*** -0.0102** -0.0171*** 
 
(-5.920) (-2.320) (-3.132) 
2010 -0.0291*** -0.0217*** -0.0057 
 
(-5.751) (-5.060) (-1.097) 
PolBk * Mkt Structure -0.0026* -0.0026** 0.0017 
 
(-1.833) (-2.326) (0.986) 
IMD income deprivation 0.0011 0.0347*** 0.0173 
 
(0.125) (2.748) (1.418) 
IMD living environment deprivation 0.0001* -0.0001 0.0000 
 
(1.783) (-1.521) (0.583) 
Incapacity claims % 0.0568 -0.0028 0.0695 
 
(0.857) (-0.035) (0.752) 
Disability claims % 0.0893* -0.0210 0.0840 
 
(1.786) (-0.336) (1.116) 
Female 0.0096*** -0.0119*** 0.0158*** 
 
(7.923) (-8.590) (9.380) 
Patient age 0.0036*** 0.0013*** 0.0042*** 
 
(21.581) (5.885) (15.640) 
Num of Diagnosis 0.0017*** 0.0072*** -0.0147*** 
 
(3.298) (17.544) (-20.454) 
Weighted Charlson Index = 1 0.0271*** 0.0148*** 0.0294*** 
 
(18.316) (9.465) (13.509) 
Weighted Charlson Index >= 2 0.0947*** 0.0710*** 0.0859*** 
 
(37.547) (22.267) (23.845) 
Teaching hospital 0.0009 0.0036 0.0051 
 
(0.159) (1.131) (0.379) 
Foundation Trust 0.0023 -0.0026 0.0014 
 
(0.840) (-0.952) (0.350) 
Distance to hospital -0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 
(-0.237) (-5.074) (-2.758) 
age 45-54 years -0.0283*** -0.0070** -0.0122*** 
 
(-14.872) (-2.128) (-3.045) 
age 55-64 years -0.0466*** -0.0163*** -0.0282*** 
 
(-14.346) (-3.309) (-4.720) 
age 65-74 years -0.0425*** -0.0195*** -0.0257*** 
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(-8.879) (-2.815) (-3.105) 
Admitted from home -0.0144*** -0.0020 -0.0012 
 
(-3.330) (-0.593) (-0.122) 
Admitted from temporary location -0.0150** -0.0057 0.0158 
 
(-2.051) (-0.752) (0.912) 
admission on Sunday 0.0020 0.0026 0.0203*** 
 
(1.010) (1.130) (7.204) 
admission on Tuesday -0.0031* 0.0009 0.0034 
 
(-1.954) (0.414) (1.266) 
admission on Wednesday -0.0018 -0.0007 0.0052** 
 
(-1.003) (-0.300) (2.038) 
admission on Thursday -0.0009 -0.0020 0.0017 
 
(-0.504) (-0.924) (0.667) 
admission on Friday -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0018 
 
(-0.333) (-0.120) (-0.771) 
admission on Saturday -0.0015 -0.0021 0.0150*** 
 
(-0.794) (-1.022) (4.875) 
admission in February -0.0022 0.0004 -0.0001 
 
(-0.989) (0.138) (-0.030) 
admission in March -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0111*** 
 
(-0.861) (-0.398) (-3.124) 
admission in April 0.0039* 0.0013 -0.0016 
 
(1.754) (0.438) (-0.464) 
admission in May -0.0040* 0.0018 -0.0107*** 
 
(-1.731) (0.617) (-2.903) 
admission in June -0.0001 0.0029 -0.0068* 
 
(-0.023) (0.972) (-1.940) 
admission in July 0.0002 0.0011 -0.0091** 
 
(0.099) (0.391) (-2.529) 
admission in August -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0151*** 
 
(-0.612) (0.069) (-3.988) 
admission in September -0.0034 0.0004 -0.0102*** 
 
(-1.501) (0.149) (-2.753) 
admission in October -0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0038 
 
(-0.696) (-0.276) (-1.035) 
admission in November -0.0014 0.0011 0.0020 
 
(-0.620) (0.378) (0.493) 
admission in December 0.0050** 0.0033 0.0114*** 
 
(2.075) (1.341) (2.837) 
I211 -0.0176***   
 (-12.569)   
I212 -0.0035   
 (-0.979)   
I213 -0.0245***   
 (-4.730)   
I214 -0.0508***   
 (-24.688)   
I219 0.0222***   
 (8.083)   
I220 0.0043   
 (0.979)   
I221 -0.0145***   
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 (-4.334)   
I228 -0.0404***   
 (-9.369)   
I229 0.0026   
 (0.867)   
pertrochanteric hip fracture 
 
-0.0016 
 
  
(-1.097) 
 subtrochanteric hip fracture 
 
-0.0032 
 
  
(-1.096) 
 Ischemic Stroke 
  
-0.0472*** 
   
(-12.304) 
Heamorrhagic Stroke 
  
0.1831*** 
   
(41.268) 
Occlusion Stroke 
  
-0.0382*** 
   
(-3.253) 
Other Stroke 
  
-0.0944*** 
   
(-18.163) 
Constant -0.1304*** -0.0679*** -0.0686*** 
 
(-14.563) (-6.447) (-4.155) 
R^2 0.0518 0.0520 0.0889 
AIC 14847.7 -54733.0 163920.7 
BIC 15397.4 -54309.1 164403.5 
Patients 288279 91005 214103 
Hospital sites 238 213 236 
Baseline sub-diagnoses are I210, Unspecified Hip Fracture, Occlusive Stroke. 
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Table B4. Impact of 2006 choice reform at sub-diagnosis level 
 AMI Hip fracture Stroke 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Any MI diagnosis* P t * 0hM  -0.0007       
 (-0.47)       
Acute transmural MI anterior wall* P t* 0hM   -0.0005     
  (-0.21)     
Acute transmural MI inferior wall* P t * 0hM   0.0001     
  (0.03)     
Acute transmural MI other sites* P t * 0hM   -0.0104***     
  (-2.92)     
Acute transmural MI unspec site* P t * 0hM   -0.0133***     
  (-3.50)     
Acute subendocardial MI* P t * 0hM     -0.0039*     
  (-1.92)     
AMI, unspecified* P t * 0hM   -0.0006     
  (-0.32)     
Subsequent MI anterior wall* P t * 0hM   -0.0038     
  (-0.80)     
Subsequent MI inferior wall* P t * 0hM   0.0024     
  (0.62)     
Subsequent MI other sites* P t * 0hM   0.0037     
  (0.71)     
Subsequent MI unspecified sites* P t * 0hM   0.0021     
  (0.90)     
Any hip fracture diagnosis* P t * 0hM    -0.0024**    
   (-1.991)    
Unspecified* P t * 0hM     -0.0023*   
    (-1.850)   
Petrochanteric* P t * 0hM     -0.0022   
    (-1.435)   
Subtrochanteric* P t * 0hM     -0.0041   
    (-1.505)   
Any stroke diagnosis* P t * 0hM      -0.0006  
     (-0.334)  
Ischaemic* P t * 0hM       -0.0007 
      (-0.342) 
Haemorrhagic* P t * 0hM       0.0025 
      (0.796) 
Occlusion* P t * 0hM       0.0178* 
      (1.785) 
Unspecified* P t * 0hM       -0.0060** 
      (-2.339) 
Other* P t * 0hM       0.0050 
      (1.094) 
F test: all sub-diagnoses* P t * 0hM = 0  3.35  1.43  3.12 
p value  0.0004  0.2363  0.0095 
R2 0.0551 0.0551 0.0532 0.0532 0.0912 0.0912 
AIC 13948 13948 -54777 -54773 163473 163466 
BIC 14953 15048 -54014 -53991 164346 164380 
Patients 288279 288279 91005 91005 214103 214103 
Sites 238 238 213 213 236 236 
Notes. Specification is text equation (1) with the replacement of P t * 0hM with sub-diagnostic* Pt * 0hM in columns (ii), 
(iv), (vi). t statistics in parentheses.   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01  
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Table B5.  Impact of choice reform by income deprivation quintile  
 AMI Hip fracture Stroke 
Pt * 0hM  -0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 
 (-0.023) (0.111) (0.126) 
1st quintile deprivation* Pt *( 0hM   0M )  -0.0002 -0.0045** -0.0005 
 (-0.084) (-2.241) (-0.186) 
2nd quintile deprivation* Pt *( 0hM   0M ) 0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0012 
 (0.065) (-0.840) (-0.464) 
3rd quintile deprivation* Pt *( 0hM   0M ) -0.0019 -0.0030 -0.0022 
 (-1.038) (-1.563) (-0.843) 
4th  quintile deprivation* Pt *( 0hM   0M ) -0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0020 
 (-1.016) (-0.720) (-0.718) 
1st quintile deprivation 0.0005 0.0112** 0.0063 
 (0.125) (1.996) (1.010) 
2nd quintile deprivation  0.0007 0.0088** 0.0063 
 (0.238) (2.067) (1.215) 
3rd quintile deprivation  0.0032 0.0020 0.0068 
 (1.285) (0.581) (1.611) 
4th quintile deprivation  0.0009 0.0050 0.0032 
 (0.398) (1.523) (0.782) 
1st quintile deprivation* Pt  0.0012 -0.0057 0.0068 
 (0.225) (-0.880) (0.855) 
2nd quintile deprivation* Pt  0.0022 -0.0076 0.0021 
 (0.534) (-1.524) (0.299) 
3rd quintile deprivation* Pt  -0.0018 -0.0023 0.0001 
 (-0.501) (-0.552) (0.011) 
4th quintile deprivation* Pt  -0.0020 -0.0040 0.0006 
 (-0.607) (-0.994) (0.106) 
Constant -0.1509*** -0.0871*** -0.0490** 
 (-11.228) (-5.101) (-1.991) 
R2 0.0551 0.0533 0.0912 
AIC 13960.6 -54763.2 163484.6 
BIC 15070.6 -53906.1 164460.7 
F test: all deprivation quintile* P t *( 0hM   0M ) = 0 0.67 1.79 0.29 
p-value 0.6115 0.1310 0.8838 
Patients 288279 91005 214103 
Hospital sites 238 213 236 
Notes. Specification is text equation (1) except for addition of interactions of deprivation quintile dummies with 
P t *( 0M   0M ) and interactions of deprivation quintile dummies with P t * ( 0M   0M ), and replacement of 
continuous deprivation measure with deprivation quintile dummies.  1st quintile has highest deprivation. t 
statistics in parentheses.   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01  
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Appendix C.   Gaynor et al (2013) specification 
  
 Gaynor et al. (2013) use two years (2003/4 and 2007/8) to avoid possible confounding of the 
effect of Choice with other policy changes and estimate a form of difference in differences 
(DID) specification.  Their unit of analysis is the Hospital Trust and they measure quality as 
mortality rate for the Trust, and use Trust level casemix variables.  In terms of our individual 
level data their specification is :  
 0 1 ( 2007/8) 2003 ( 2007/8)iht t h t iht h ihtq ME E J P H  c     1 1 x Ȝ                     (C1) 
J is change in the effect of frozen 2003 market structure between 2003/4 and 2007/8.   
 
Column (i) of Table C1 reports the result from this DID specification estimate with our 
individual patient level.  Column (ii) adds dummy variables for 9 AMI sub-diagnoses, and 
column (iii) has all covariates interacted with the 2007 year dummy and is similar to our 
baseline model (equation (1) in the text).  
 
We see that, as with text Table 3 that when the effects of the covariates and sub-diagnoses are 
allowed to vary before and after the change in choice policy (column (iii) the effect of 
relaxing the constraints becomes smaller (though it remains much larger than in the model 
using all the data for 2002/3 to 2010/11) and statistically insignificant.  
 
Table C1. Market structure and choice: difference in difference specification  
 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
 AMI AMI AMI 
2007*Rivals 2003 (Ȗ) -0.0054** -0.0062** -0.0024 
 
(-2.166) (-2.190) (-0.865) 
    
R2 0.0523 0.0604 0.0642 
AIC 6013.6 5449.1 5259.9 
BIC 6360.4 5878.0 6099.4 
F-test: all sub-diagnoses coefficients = 0  36.62 26.13 
p value 
 0.0000 0.0000 
F test: all P t*covariates coefficients = 0   45.71 
p-value 
 
 0.0000 
Patients 67854 67854 67854 
Hospitals 152 152 152 
AMI sub-diagnoses? N Y Y 
Time varying effect of covariates? N N Y 
Notes.  Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died within 30 days of admission. Column (i) model: same 
covariates as models in main text but not sub-diagnoses. Column (ii) model as in (i) but with sub-diagnoses 
dummies. Column (iii) model as in (i) but with 2007 year dummy interacted with all covariates and sub-
diagnoses. Period: financial years 2003/4 and 2007/8 only. Market structure: average of Equivalent N rival sites 
(= 1/(predicted HHI at 30 km)) within each hospital Trust. Cluster-robust standard errors at Trust level. t-
statistics in parentheses.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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